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Abstract: One of the most contentious challenges facing the Nigerian federal experiment today is that of revenue allocation. Right 
from the colonial era till present, finding an acceptable revenue formula has remained intractable as the various attempts have not 
gained wide acceptance. This paper chronicles the various revenue commissions in Nigeria and the formulae derived there from.  
Data for the paper were mainly from secondary sources. The theoretical nerve of the paper is based on the nature of 
intergovernmental fiscal relations. The findings indicate that the derivation principle has been the main bone of contention since 
the discovery of oil in Nigeria. Based on this, the paper recommends a serious restructuring of the Nigerian federation to grant the 
various component units enough autonomy to develop at their own pace, while economic viability should be the main basis for 
creation of states and local governments. These states and local governments should also be encouraged to develop other revenue 
sources outside oil, and finally the issue of revenue allocation should be made open for all Nigerians to contribute in the true spirit 
of democracy. 
 




Federalism entails the simultaneous existence of at  least 
two levels of government in a state. Since these levels of 
government serve essentially the same people, there is 
usually the need to have some structures, procedures and 
processes for handling their joint affairs. These are referred 
to as intergovernmental relations. Though intergovernmental 
relations exist in virtually all governmental systems, it is 
more pronounced in federal systems. In fact, some scholars 
tend to believe that federalism is synonymous with 
intergovernmental relations. It is this thinking that informs 
the saying by Reagan (1972), that “federalism old style is 
dead. Yet, federalism new-style is alive and well and living 
in the US. Its name is intergovernmental relations” (p.3).  
Perhaps,   the perception by Anderson who is seen as the 
originator of the concept of intergovernmental relations, that 
it exists only in federal systems may have influenced this 
line of thinking. However, practical experience and evidence 
have disproved this, as there are traces of intergovernmental 
relations in unitary states. This is because unitary states also 
have subordinate governments that are created by the central 
government that assist them, hence, some structures and 
procedures that help to coordinate their joint endeavours. 
These structures and procedures are intergovernmental 
relations. 
  In this paper, we are going to look at    federalism 
and the politics of revenue allocation in Nigeria In  doing 
this, the paper is divided into six  sections including the 
introduction. The second section briefly discusses the theory 
of federalism, and the concept of intergovernmental 
relations. The third is a theoretical exposition on the nature 
of intergovernmental fiscal relations, while the fourth is on 
revenue allocation in Nigeria. The fifth looks at oil and the 
derivation principle, while the sixth and final section serves 
as the conclusion.  l 
2. FEDERALISM  
 Federalism is a system of government that 
emphasizes a constitutional division of governmental powers 
between levels of government in such a way that each level 
enjoys some significant measure of independence within its 
sphere of jurisdiction. Heywood (2002), believes that 
“federal systems are based upon a compromise between 
unity and regional diversity, between the need for an 
effective central power and the need for checks or constrains 
on that power (p.161). More elaborately, he offers a deeper 
explanation of federalism thus:  
 Federalism (from the Latin foedus, meaning „pact‟, 
or „covenant‟) usually referred to legal and political 
structures that distribute power territorially within a 
state. Nevertheless, in accordance with its original 
meaning, it has been taken to imply reciprocity or 
mutuality (Proudhon), or , in the writings of 
Alexander Hamilton and James Madison (see 
p.320), to be a broader ideology of pluralism. As a 
political form, however, federalism requires the 
existence of two distinct levels of government, 
neither of which is legally or politically subordinate 
to the other. Its central feature is therefore the 
notion of shared sovereignty. On the basis of this 
definition,  classical federations are few in number: 
the USA, Switzerland, Belgium, Canada and 
Australia. However, many more states have federal-
type features (p.161). 
 It would be necessary to state here that the first 
notable attempt to build a theory of federalism started with 
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the seminal work of Kenneth C. Wheare titled „Federal 
Government‟. This pioneering work elicited a lot of 
scholarly interest to the extent that it almost divided theorists 
on federalism into two camps in terms of those for and 
against Wheare . 
 In the book, Wheare defined federalism as “a 
method of dividing powers so that general and regional 
governments are each, within a sphere, coordinate and 
independent”(p.10). This definition was criticized by some 
scholars for being too legalistic. Others criticized it for being 
more or less an explanation of American federalism which 
they felt Wheare was depicting as the idea form of 
federalism of . Carl  Friedrich introduced another dimension 
to the understanding of federalism. According to him, 
“federalism is a process rather than a design…….Any 
particular design or pattern of competencies or jurisdictions 
is merely a phase, a short-run view of a continually evolving 
political reality” (p.1). Drawing the argument further, he 
asserts that “if thus understood as a process of federalizing it 
will become apparent that federalism may be operating in 
both the direction of integration and differentiation”(p.2). 
 Thus Friedrich has introduced the process view into 
explaining the federal concept. This attempt is useful, 
because according to Jinadu(1979), it “makes it possible for 
an understanding of recent developments in federal 
government which, were one to operate under Wheare‟s 
formulation, would otherwise be difficult to 
comprehend”(p.18). 
 Another scholar who made an important 
contribution to the study of federalism is William S. 
Livingston.  Incidentally, his contribution was also in 
reaction to Wheare‟s postulation. To him:  
 Federalism is not an absolute but a relative term; 
there is no specific point at which a society ceases 
to be unified and becomes diversified. The 
differences are of degree rather than of kind.  All 
countries fall somewhere in a spectrum which runs 
from… a theoretically wholly integrated society at 
one extreme, to a theoretically wholly diversified at 
the other (p.25).  
To emphasize  his aversion to Wheare‟s  „juridical‟ approach 
to federalism, he argues that:  
 The essential nature of federalism is to be sought 
for, not in the shading of legal and constitutional 
terminology, but in the forces- economic,    social, 
political, cultural-that have made the outward forms 
of federalism necessary……The essence of 
federalism lies not in the institutional or 
constitutional structure but in the society itself. 
Federal government is a device by which the federal 
qualities of the society are articulated and 
protected”(pp.1-2). 
 From the above, it is clear that Livingston has 
introduced a sociological angle to the conceptualization of 
federalism. This is because he distinguishes between a 
federal constitution which is a legal document drawn up by 
the component units in a federation and a federal society 
which is a pre-disposing factor towards the formation of 
federations. Thus, it the existence of diversities of culture, 
language, religion etc among people within a particular  
geographical area that make them want to form a federation 
in order to still maintain unity in diversity. 
 There is perhaps no doubt that each of these 
perspectives contributes somewhat  to our understanding of 
federalism because just as Dare (1979) argues “each 
approach is a narrow perspective of the broad theme and 
none by itself explains the totality of the federal concept or 
its dynamics”(p.34). 
3. INTERGOVERNMENTAL  RELATIONS 
 Intergovernmental relations  according  to Denhandt 
and Denhardt (2009), “is often used to encompass all 
complex interdependent relationships involving those at 
various levels of  government as they seek to develop and 
implement government programmes.” (p.84). It is still 
further defined as an array of structures, processes, 
institutions and mechanisms for coping with the inevitable 
overlap and interdependence that is a feature of modern 
life”(p.127). Finally, Obi and Nwankwo (2014), posit that: 
 There is no doubt that intergovernmental relations 
clearly involves mechanisms devised in a state to 
handle areas of joint competencies and also 
harmonize the activities of the different  levels in a 
way  to make for a smooth relationship and build 
the necessary synergy in government 
operations(p.1). 
4.  THEORITICAL EXPOSITION- THE  NATURE  OF  
INTERGOVERNMENTAL  FISCAL TRANSFERS 
 In virtually all federal systems, there is usually 
some form of   'resources sharing' among the levels of 
government. Many reasons have been adduced for this, but 
there are three main reasons which seem to be widespread. 
The first has to do with the nature of the functions and 
revenue sources of the three levels of government.  The 
functions and revenues of these three levels of government 
are determined either traditionally, constitutionally or from 
the administrative point of view, and an imbalance may 
develop between revenues and responsibilities. It then 
becomes the duty of the higher level of government to make 
good such an imbalance by making transfer of financial 
resources to lower levels of government. These type of 
transfers are referred to as deficiency transfers or balancing 
(Olalokun 1979). 
 Secondly, there are variations in the capacity of the 
different levels of government to raise revenue. The lower 
levels may not have enough capacity to raise enough revenue 
to take care of their minimum needs. When it is realized that 
in a federation, it is desirable for every state or locality to 
attain a certain minimum level of services, it then becomes 
clear that for these areas that have low revenue-raising 
capacity to meet up with the national minimum, they may 
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have to impose heavier taxes on inhabitants of such areas, 
thereby making them poorer. The need to prevent this 
heavier tax burden makes it necessary that the higher level of 
government should transfer resources to them. This type of 
transfers is known as equalization transfers. 
 The third type of transfer which is known as 
'stimulation' 'incentive' or 'promotional' transfers are ones 
which are made to states or localities for specific purposes. 
In other words, the recipient authorities are told what 
particular projects or programmes that they should spend the 
resources on. While the first two types are known as 
unconditional grants, the third is known as conditional grants 
. 
 James Buchanan, in a paper titled "Federalism and 
Fiscal Equity' published in the American Economic Review 
in 1950, made the first noted attempt at rationalizing the 
adoption of grants in fiscal federalism. In that paper, 
Buchanan argued that under fiscal federalism an individual is 
subject to the influence of the fiscal operations of three 
different levels of government. Based on this, the old view of 
horizontal equity in the context of fiscal federalism, which 
states that citizens in similar circumstances should be given 
the same fiscal treatment, is not enough. A more meaningful 
approach in his view is the one that takes account of the 
overall fiscal pressure on an individual. This pressure is 
measured in terms of what he calls 'fiscal residuum' and 
which he defines as "the balance between the contributions 
made and the value of the public services returned to the 
individual. Buchanan believes that based on the state of 
income distribution, the "fiscal residuum" should be negative 
for low income individuals and positive for high-income 
individuals. For the achievement of horizontal equity 
between two individuals, the necessary and sufficient 
condition is that their fiscal residua be equal. This means that 
two individuals in similar circumstances received the same 
fiscal treatment if their fiscal 'residua are equal (Olalokun 
1979). 
 Buchanan's worry was that in maintaining 
horizontal equity, citizens in a relatively  poor locality would 
be taxed higher, for the level of public services provided in 
their locality to be at par with that of the relatively rich 
localities. He sees such a situation as being undesirable and 
also a violation of the principles of fiscal equity and that of 
efficient resource allocation. Consequently, Buchanan 
suggested that the best way to handle this situation was a 
system of resource transfers. His suggestion was in favour of 
the unequal treatment of equals by the central government. 
This means citizens in a rich loyalty should be taxed more 
heavily than those in a poor locality. He believes that this 
system of a "geographically discriminatory central income 
taxation" is the best means of achieving horizontal equity. 
However, in recognition of the constitutional barriers against 
this system in the United States, Buchanan offered a second 
best option of intergovernmental fiscal adjustment in the 
form of unconditional equalization grants (Olalokun 1979). 
 The clear possibility of Buchanan's model running 
into difficulties in actual practice has led to its critical 
examination by public finance experts. The result has been 
its modification. Thus Graham (1963), has questioned his 
use of the term 'Fiscal Residuum'. Graham believes, 
Buchanan's use of the term, was a result of his attempt to 
take full account of both sides of the fiscal balance sheet 
(taxes paid and services returned) in arriving at a more 
meaningful definition of horizontal equity. But, because the 
level of services is one of the determinants of individual 
welfare, what has to be satisfied is the equality of what he 
called "overall fiscal treatment" of two similarly situated 
individuals rather than just the equality of their residua. To 
Graham, overall fiscal treatment implies that both the level 
of services, as well as the burden of taxes should also be 
taken into account in determining the satisfaction of 
horizontal equity norms. In other words, fiscal equity 
demands that individuals in all jurisdictions across the 
country enjoy the same good level of services for the same 
tax burdens (Olalokun 1979,p.113). 
 As we have pointed out earlier, fiscal transfers from 
higher to lower levels of government in federations come 
under two broad categories, conditional and unconditional 
grants. There are considerable debates and arguments about 
which of the two is better. So many reasons have been 
adduced to justify the use of conditional grants. Olalokun 
(1979:185.186), has outlined them: 
 Firstly, the federal government through the use of 
conditional grants tries to maintain a minimum national 
standard throughout the federation. 
 Secondly, federal grants-in-aid help to introduce the 
much needed flexibility into the operation of the 
constitutional system. This point is justified on the grounds 
that conditional grants are a means of pragmatically 
realigning financial power to constitutional responsibilities 
once and for all. Bearing in mind that the tax field of the 
federal government usually has greater growth generating 
capacity than those of the state governments, Federal fiscal 
transfers is said to be a good device for adjusting the 
inelastic state revenues to their continually expanding 
responsibilities. 
 Thirdly, it is a means of correcting fiscal imbalance 
among the state governments. Since the various states have 
differing capacities in their economic resources, it follows 
that, the tax burden may vary from state to state, with 
residents of poorer states paying higher taxes if their states 
must meet up with the national minimum standard. The 
intervention of the federal government through conditional 
grants prevents this from happening. 
 Fourthly, it is a device for redistributing wealth in 
the name of balance and even national development. There is 
no doubt that extreme polarization of wealth or development 
along geographical lines is dangerous to the survival of any 
federation, Hence, it behooves the federal government to 
allocate resources in such a way that it helps backward areas 
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grow out of their backwardness, though this may not be in 
the interest of optimization of resources. 
 Fifthly, it helps to compensate for the adverse effect 
of national policies on some states. Since some federal 
policies do affect some states adversely, natural justice 
demands that such states should be compensated for 
whatever losses or negative effects of such policies on them. 
Conditional grants perform such duties. 
 Sixthly, it could be given to encourage uniformity 
in specific state legislation and public policy across the land, 
especially in areas where the federal government has no 
constitutional responsibility. 
 Finally, conditional grants are made to take care of 
disasters and emergencies in states. On the reverse side of it, 
Conditional grants are known to have a distorting effect on 
the programmes or policies of state governments. This 
becomes more pronounced when the grant requires a 
matching grant. The money that would be used by the state 
to match the federal grant, may be money already earmarked 
for something else. 
 Conditional grants also have the effect of 
strengthening the federal government vis-a-vis the states. 
Since he who pays the piper dictates the tune, conditional 
grants may make the states subservient to the federal 
government and financial subordination does not make for a 
good federation. 
 Also, there is the argument that the federal 
government can use these grants to favour some states or 
sections of the country to the detriment of others. There have 
been loud allegations of such in Nigeria. While conditional 
grants, stipulate uses or areas where the recipient would 
spend the money; unconditional grants leave it open. The 
recipient has more discretion in determining the uses to 
which it will utilize the grants on. In terms of the utility of 
unconditional grants, Olalokun (1979),  argues that, "it has 
been conclusively demonstrated that the objective of the 
maximization of state or local welfare can better be achieved 
by the use of unconditional grants"(p.111).  
Revenue Allocation in Nigeria 
 The above statement by  vividly captures the 
underlying reasons behind the acrimony and struggle over 
revenue allocation in Nigeria. We now turn to the various 
fiscal commissions that have been set up in Nigeria. 
 The introduction of the Richards constitution in 
1946, necessitated for the first time in the history of Nigeria, 
a revenue allocation commission. The reason for this was 
because it was that constitution that introduced regionalism 
into the country. The initiator of that constitution, Sir Arthur 
Richards later explained that it was meant to create “a 
unitary state with local government centers in the Regions”. 
More explicitly the constitution was meant to achieve three 
main objectives: the promotion of unity in Nigeria; the 
adequate provision within that unity for the diverse elements 
which make up the country and securing of greater 
participation of natives in the determination of their affairs. 
In a letter to the Secretary of State for Colonies, Sir Richards 
said the Constitution was meant: 
 To create a political system which is itself a present 
advance and contains the living possibility of further orderly 
advance system within which the diverse elements may 
progress at varying speeds, amicably and smoothly towards a 
more closely integrated economic, social and political unity 
without sacrificing the principles and ideas in their divergent 
ways of life (cited in Coleman 1966). 
 Consequent upon the new regional political 
structure, Sir Sidney Phillipson was appointed to “Study 
comprehensively and make recommendations regarding the 
problems of the administrative and financial procedure to be 
adopted under the new constitution”( cited in Obikeze, Obi 
& Iwuoha 2017). The principles of derivation and even 
development was adopted by the Phillipson Commission for 
revenue allocation. It should be noted that derivation had 
more weight than any other consideration. 
 In 1951, another revenue commission was 
appointed to review the existing formula in anticipation of 
the MacPherson Constitution. The report of John Hicks and 
Sidney Phillipson known as Hick-Phillipson Commission 
added new criteria to the allocation formula; independent 
revenues for the regions, need and national interest.  For the 
first time, regional governments were given the power of 
independent revenue and tax jurisdiction. They were 
empowered to impose specific taxes. In summary, the  Hick-
Philipson Commission de-emphasized the principle of 
derivation in favour of need and national interest. Thus 
proportions of specified duties and taxes  were allocated to 
regions by derivation, while special .grants were made to 
them in respect of capitation (that is per head), education, 
police and equalisation (Osisioma, 1996, p.67). 
  The Sir Louis Chick Commission was appointed in 
1953 to review the revenue formula in anticipation of the 
Lyttleton Constitution that will come into operation in 1954. 
The Commission was set up with a mandate to fashion out a 
formula that will:  
 take care of...the need to provide the regions and the 
centre an adequate measure of fiscal autonomy within their 
own sphere of government and that the total revenue 
available to Nigeria are allocated in such a way that the 
principle of Derivation is followed to the fullest degree 
compatible with meeting the reasonable needs of the centre 
and each of the  Regions.(Cited in Obikeze, Obi & Iwuoha 
2017).   
 Consequently the 1954 Constitution emphasized 
greater regional autonomy and derivation as the main criteria 
on which revenue was distributed between the centre and the 
Regions. Derivation now covered all federal revenues 
allocated to the Regions, while 100 percent of revenues from 
import duty on motor spirits, federal income tax royalties 
and rents from mining, 50 percent of revenue from duties on 
all other imports as well as 50 percent of all export duties 
were all distributed according to the principle of derivation. 
Estimates of each regions consumption of dutiable imports 
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and goods on which excise taxes were paid were used to 
weight its share of revenue allocated by the federal 
Government (Olalokun 1979,p.  ). 
 On the 10th of October 1957, another fiscal 
commission was appointed on the recommendation of the 
Nigerian constitutional conference held earlier in the year in 
London. The Two-man Commission had Sir Jeremy 
Raisman as Chairman and Professor R.C Tress as member. 
The Commission was charged with the task of correcting the 
deficiencies of the existing formula and to in particular look 
at: 
A The limited range of independent revenues at the 
disposal of the regions; 
B The weakness in the application of the principle of 
derivation on which so much  stress had been laid in 
the past; and          
C The absence so far of any provision whereby a 
region could be treated for revenue allocation purposes from 
the point of view of needs rather than on the  basis of the 
amount of revenues generated within its boundaries. 
 The Raisman and Tress Commission tried to play 
down on the derivation formula. A Distributable Pool 
Account (DPA), was set up for other taxes which were not 
regional or federal. This was made up of 30 percent of 
mining royalties and rents and 30 percent of general import 
revenue to be allocated to the regional governments in this 
order: North 40 percent, West 24 percent, East 31 percent 
and Southern Cameroons 5 percent. The recommendations of 
Raisman and Tress formed the core of Nigeria's revenue 
allocation system till the late 1960‟s.  The major significance 
of that Commission remains its creation of the Distribution 
Pool Account (DPA) as a counter-balance to derivation thus 
defining to a large extent, the poles of conflict around which 
the struggles over revenue were to take place after 
independence (Obi, C. 2000, cited in Obi 2004,p.91) 
 The last revenue commission headed by a non-
Nigerian was Binn's Commission appointed in 1964 but 
whose report was published in 1965. The Commission‟s 
recommendation was that the DPA should be increased from 
30 to 35 percent of revenue from import duties, mining rents 
and royalties. It also recommended the principle of financial 
comparability (comprising the overall cash position of each 
regional government, the extent of its own effort to relieve 
its financial needs, and the standard of services provided by 
the regions)(Anyanwu,1993) .  
 The Binn's Commission‟s recommendation was still 
the basis of revenue allocation when the military struck early 
in 1966 . However, the promulgation of Decree No. 15 of 
May 1967, which divided the country into twelve states from 
the hitherto four Regions had some implications for revenue 
allocation. Following the crisis situation in Nigeria then, the 
federal Government could not appoint another commission 
to review the formula to reflect the new structure. What was 
done was simply to sub-divide each regions revenue among 
the new states in the Region. While the Northern states 
shared theirs on the basis of equality, the East and West 
shared theirs on the basis of population. The arbitrary nature 
of this allocation formula was sharply criticized. This led the 
Federal Military Government to inaugurate in July 1968, the 
Interim Revenue Allocation Review Committee (IRARC) 
headed by Chief I. O. Dina.  
 The Dina Committee was charged to “look into and 
suggest any change in the existing system of revenue 
sources”(Adesina, 2000). The Committee submitted its 
report in February 1969. Its major concern was trying to 
fashion out a formula that will take care of the problem of 
uneven development which it identified as one of the major 
problems confronting the Nigerian federation. Thus, it 
recommended that 90 percent of mining rents and royalties 
should be paid into the Distributable Pool  Account which it 
renamed States Joint Account (SJA), for distribution to the 
various states, while 10 percent goes to the states of origin. 
In sharing the States Joint Account,, the major considerations 
should be need, minimum responsibility of states,  derivation 
and  balanced development. The Dina Committee report was 
never implemented, instead the federal Military Government 
promulgated Decree No,13 of 1970 which took retrospective 
effect from Ist April 1969. According to this Decree, revenue 
sharing was based on 50 percent population, and equality of 
states 50 percent. The state‟s share of revenue from export 
duties, motor spirit and excise duties was reduced from 100 
percent to 60 percent, and 50 percent respectively. The 
federal government‟s share of mining rents was also 
increased from 15 to 20 percent. Later Decree No.9 of 1971, 
gave 100 percent of off-shore mining rents and royalties to 
the federal government. Decree No.15 of 1972, further 
amended the sharing formula, thus, giving the federal 
government 100% of all taxes paid by Armed Forces 
Personnel, External Affairs officers and Pensioners 
Overseas. 
 Under Decree No.6 of 1975, all revenue from 
import duties on motor spirits, tobacco, mining rents and 
royalties on off shore production were paid into the DPA. 20 
percent of on-shore receipts go to the state of production, 
while the remaining 80 percent goes to the DPA.                                        
 In preparation for the return to civil rule, the 
military government set up the Aboyade Technical 
Committee on Revenue Allocation in 1977. The Committees' 
recommendations for sharing national revenue were: 
 Equality of Access to Development Opportunities(25 
percent);  
National Minimum Standards For National Integration (22 
percent),  
Absorptive Capacity   (20 percent); 
 Independent Revenue effort  (18 percent); and   
Fiscal Efficiency    (15 percent).    
 According to it, the fixed proportional share of the 
federation Account among the federal, state and local 
governments are; Federal Government 57 percent, States 30 
percent, Local Governments, 10 percent and 3 percent to oil 
producing states and ecological problems. The Committee's 
report was however rejected because it translated the 
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principles it had recommended into statistical and 
mathematical calculations that would require a huge volume 
of accurate statistical details to back them up. The report was 
heavily criticized because of its obvious over dependence on 
statistics, so it was considered too unrealistic to last for more 
than a few years(Adesina, 2000) 
 Since the military did not leave any acceptable 
revenue formula following the rejection of the Aboyade 
report, President Shagari on assumption of office in 1979 
inaugurated the Okigbo Revenue Allocation Commission. 
The Commission submitted its report in 1980; it 
recommended the sharing of revenue as follows; Federal 
government 53%, States 30%, Local Governments 10%, and 
Special Funds 7% to cater for mineral producing areas and 
ecological funds. lt further recommended that funds among 
states and local governments should be shared using the 
following principles:  
Minimum Responsibility or equality      - 40% 
Population                                                - 40%                       
Social Development   
 Direct                       11.25% 
 Inverse                              3,75%  
                                                                 -15% 
Internal Revenue effort                             -5% 
 
 The federal government accepted the report with 
minor amendments as follows: Federal Government 55%, 
States 30%, Local Governments 8% and Special Funds 7%. 
The  National Assembly, further amended the Bill before 
passing it into law in 1981. The Okigbo Commissions report 
was highly criticized. According to Adesina( 2000) :  
 The aspect  of the Commissions report which drew 
the ire of  people were the proportion of federally collected 
revenue that was assigned to the federal government; the 
inclusion of the Federal Capital Territory in the vertical 
sharing scheme; federal governments control of the  special 
funds and the proportion of the special funds earmarked for 
mineral producing areas; and on the relative share of  the  
federal government from the federation vis-a-vis the other 
layers of government (cited in Obi 2004,p.93). 
 As if in line with public opinion the Supreme Court 
declared   the  Allocation Act of 1981 null and void after it 
was challenged in court by the then Bendel State 
Government. Following the voiding of the Revenue Act, the 
federal government modified it  and it was passed into law in 
January 1982.  The new Act had the following formula: 
 Federal Government 55%;   States 35%; and   Local 
Governments 10%.  
30.5% of the states share was shared on the following basis; 
Minimum Responsibility           =  40% 
Population                                   = 40% 
Social 
Development                                     =15% 
Internal Revenue effort             =  5% 
The remaining 4,5% was shared thus; 
Federal fund for Ecological problems          = 1% 
Allocation to mineral producing areas based on derivation 
=2% 
Federal Fund for development of mineral producing areas        
=15% 
 The military government that sacked the Shagari 
government enacted the Allocation of Revenue Amendment 
Decree Number 36 of 1984 which made some slight 
amendments to the 1981 Act. For instance it increased the 
proportion of the Federation account that was to be shared 
among the states from 30.5% to 32.5% 
 The Babangida government in 1988 set up the 
National Revenue Allocation and Fiscal Commission, with 
General T.Y Danjuma (Rtd), as Chairman. In 1989, the 
Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) considered the report 
of the Commission and adopted the following formula:  
Federal government   =50%  
States                                =30%,  
Local government,           =15%  
Special funds                    =  5% 
The principle used to share states fund was; 
Equality of states         :        40 percent 
Population                   :        30 percent 
Land mass                   :        10 percent 
Social Development   :         10 percent 
Internal Revenue effort:       10 percent 
That formula lasted till 1992 when it was slightly adjusted 
thus;  
Federal government =48.5 percent,  
States                              = 24 percent,  
Local government          = 20 percent,  
Special funds                     = 7.5%.  
 It was the above formula that the Obasanjo 
administration inherited in 1999. However the 1999 
Constitution empowers the President in section 162(2) to; 
Upon the receipt of advice, from the Revenue 
Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission, 
shall table before the National Assembly proposal 
for revenue allocation from the Federation Account, 
and in determining the formula, the National 
Assembly shall take into account, the population & 
equality of states, internal  revenue  generation , 
land mass, terrain as well as population density, 
provided that the principle of derivation shall be 
constantly reflected in any approved formula as 
being  not less than thirteen percent of the revenue 
accruing to the Federation Account directly from 
any natural resources.  
 In consonance with this constitutional provision 
(section 32(b) of the third schedule) President Obasanjo set 
up the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal 
Commission (RMAFC), with Engr. Hamman A. Tukur as 
Chairman with members drawn from all the states of the 
federation. The Commission as statutorily empowered, were 
mandated to draw up a new revenue allocation formula for 
the country.    
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 The Commission after about two years of serious 
work presented a new revenue allocation proposal to the 
President on August 16 2001. According to the proposal, the  
federal government will get 41.3 percent, the states 31  
percent and the local  governments, 16 percent, Special 
Funds 11.7 percent. The Special Funds will be shared as 
follows; Federal Capital Development Fund 1.2 percent, 
Ecological Fund 1.0 percent, National Reserve Fund 
1percent, Agriculture and Solid Mineral Fund and its 
associated Science and  Technology  Research 1.5 percent,  
Basic Education and skill Acquisition (BESA),Fund 7 
percent. 
 Almost immediately the report was presented, there 
were loud cries of foul by state Governors and Local 
Government Chairmen. Southern Governors at the end of 
their fourth meeting in Ibadan, strongly criticized the new 
revenue proposal. They advocated a uniform 36 percent for 
both the federal and state governments; 25 percent for local 
governments, 1 percent for the Federal Capital Territory and 
2 percent for Ecology.  
 The Obasanjo government  after meeting with the 
Governors to iron out some contentious issues following the 
Supreme Court ruling of 5th April 2002 in the much 
celebrated On-shore / Offshore dichotomy issue, the 
Commission had to withdraw the recommendations since 
some portions of it were affected  by the judgment.  The 
report was subsequently re-submitted  to the 5th National 
Assembly after  some amendments in  December 2002 by 
President  Obasanjo . Unfortunately the National Assembly 
could not finish deliberations on the report before the end of 
President Obasanjo‟s tenure in 2007, which also marked the 
end of the 5th National Assembly  
 At the beginning of the 6th National Assembly , the 
Commission was informed that  all bills that were not passed 
by the 5th National Assembly have elapsed and would have 
to be re-submitted. The RMAFC had to prepare another  
revenue allocation formula which was ready by December 
2013 for presentation to President Goodluck Jonathan.  
However, though the President was communicated of the 
Commissions‟ intention, for some inexplicable reasons, the 
Commission could  not get audience with him until the end 
of his tenure in 2015. Incidentally the present government 
has also not done much on it till date. Perhaps, the reason 
behind the federal government‟s reluctance to push for 
passage of the revenue allocation Bill is that the present 
formula which gives it more than fifty percent of  the   
revenue from the federation account is in its favour. 
As at today the following formula is in use: 
Federal Government:   52.68 % 
State Government:  26.72 % 
Local Government:  20.60 % 
The state share is based on the following principles: 
Equality                                                          =40% 
Population                                          =30% 
Landmass/Terrain                              =10% 
Internally Generated revenue Effort      =10% 
Social Development Effort                          =10% 
5.  OIL, DERIVATION PRINCIPLE AND REVENUE 
ALOCATION IN NIGERIA 
   The oil boom of the 1970's, which suddenly placed 
oil as the major foreign exchange earner in Nigeria led to the 
abandonment of the derivation principle as a basis for 
revenue allocation in the country(Obi,2000). Decree No 13 
of 1970 changed the formula and made population and 
equality of states the major consideration in revenue 
allocation. Later Decree No 9 of 1971 gave 100 percent of 
off-shore mining rents and royalties to the federal 
government. 
 However, the final blow on derivation came via the 
budget broadcast of Yakubu Gowon, the then Head of State 
when he said : 
 As from 1st April 1975 all portions of Customs and 
Excise duties formerly  payable to the state governments 
on the basis of derivation would be payable to  the 
Distributable Pool Account (DPA), the percentage of 
royalties payable to  state governments on the basis of 
derivation  would be reduced from 45 to 20  percent 
and the federal government will surrender it's entire,  share 
of both on-- shore and off-shore royalties into the 
Distributable Pool Account( cited by Nwokoh and  
Edemodu,2002). 
 This sudden de-emphasis on the derivation principle 
was explained by Keith Panter-Brick in the book „Soldiers 
and Oil‟ that : 
 Once the revenue from oil became dominant, the 
principle of derivation had obviously to be abandoned, so as 
to avoid a blatant disparity in the revenues of the oil 
producing states (Rivers and Midwest) and those of the rest 
the country(Panter-Brick 1978.) 
In the same book, Oyobaire argued that the “four most 
important factors making for change in the system of 
revenue allocation” in Nigeria are: 
 The removal of open competitive politics by 
military rule; the multiplication and reduction in  size of 
the component parts of the federation, the emergence of a 
national consciousness on  the part of the country's rulers and 
the overwhelming importance of the oil industry as a source 
of revenue(Oyobaire, 1978).  
 Some other analysts believe that the main reason 
why the derivation principle was jettisoned was simply 
because none of the three main tribes has oil deposits in 
large quantities. Thus, Nwokoh and Edemodu(2002), argue 
that "as oil became the mainstream of the economy and 
given it's absence in any significant quantity in any three 
dominant ethnic groups, the power elite of the three tribes 
consigned the principle of derivation to history books". 
Based on this reasoning, it can be argued that if oil were 
discovered in the territories of the major ethnic groups, the 
allocation formula would have been heavily skewed in 
favour of derivation. Also even if today the resource is 
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discovered in very large quantities in the North, definitely 
the present formula would change. 
 In trying to make sure that the federal government 
and not the states control oil resources in Nigeria, section 
42(3) of the 1979 Constitution stated that the:  
entire, property in and control of all minerals, 
mineral oils and natural gas in, under or upon any 
 land in Nigeria or in, under or upon the 
territorial waters and the exclusive zone of Nigeria 
shall  vest in the government of the federation 
and shall be managed in such manner as may be 
 prescribed by the National Assembly 
 Incidentally, the 1999 Constitution which is a 
reviewed version of the 1979 Constitution equally vested the 
control of all natural resources in the federal government 
through section 44(3). 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 The study has traced the history of revenue 
allocation in Nigeria from inception till date.. We would at 
this point ask the question what is to be done? Solving the 
revenue allocation problem we dare say will not be a very 
easy one. The reason for this being that, the issue is one that 
arose out of the inherent contradictions and imperfections of 
the Nigerian state. It is basically a reflection of the 
consequences of over-centralisation of power and the denial 
of access to certain groups based on a pre-determined 
criteria. 
 To solve this problem in a very meaningful way 
therefore, will mean a restructuring of the federation to the 
extent that the concentration of power at the centre will be 
changed so that the constituent units will have more 
autonomy to manage their own affairs and move at their own 
pace. In a restructured Nigeria economic viability should be 
the main basis of creation of states and local governments. 
They should also be encouraged to develop other revenue 
sources outside oil. Also the present situation where a few 
privileged individuals determine what they think should be 
the revenue allocation formula should be completely 
jettisoned. This is because, like Adesina(2000) said, Revenue 
allocation formula are warped because they have not been 
open covenants openly arrived at "Rather they reflect the 
views of Commissions, individuals, or groups within the 
Commissions which have not only proved unrealistic, but 
have thereby contributed to the dislocations within the 
Nigerian state.(cited in Obi 2004, p.107 ). We need a 
democratic system where Nigerians would contribute to this 
all important issue, since the elites who have been presiding 
over the matter since the pre-independence era have failed to 
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